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This paper suggests a new agenda for constructing early warning models (EWMs) to 
enhance their effectiveness in predicting financial crises. The central argument of the 
new agenda aims to eradicate the weaknesses of existing EWMs, since their failure to 
predict the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 demonstrates the need to improve their 
efficiency. We document the history of EWMs and propose a new agenda as follows: 
1) the accurate measurement of a financial crisis, 2) implementation of a fourth-
generation crisis model to capture the dynamic nature of the financial crisis, and 3) the 
inclusion of interconnectedness/contagion variables as explanatory variables for the 
financial crisis.
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1 Financial crises can be regarded as efficiency losses in the financial market and imbalances in the 
financial sector. These can take the form of sudden and stronger changes in the pricing and quantities 
of financial instruments, such as foreign exchanges, stocks, bills of exchange (Claessens and Kose, 
2013).
2 A triple crisis in year t can be defined as a banking crisis in year t combined with a currency crisis 
during the period [t - 1, t + 1] and a sovereign debt crisis during the period [t - 1, t + 1].
3 Crisis depth is defined as the peak-to-trough percentage decline in the GDP. Similarly, crisis depth 
is proxied by the cumulative loss in GDP over the length of the crisis, as a fraction of the pre-crisis 
level, whereas duration is defined as the number of years an economy’s output takes to recover to 
pre-crisis levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Predicting financial crises1 has become the central motive and a huge challenging 
task for policymakers in the face of the enormous costs associated with frequent 
financial crises. The nature of financial crises generates great costs in terms of 
economic slowdown, output losses, widespread bankruptcies, unemployment, 
financial instability, a vicious circle of low credit and insolvency, and so on 
(e.g.Krugman, 1999; IMF, 2002; Hutchison and Noy, 2006; Claessens et al., 2012; 
Laeven and Valencia, 2012; Claessens and Kose, 2013; Pritsker, 2013). These forms 
of economic consequences further lead to loss of confidence among investors, 
which is a major cause of low investment and capital outflows. The consequences 
become even more dire with the joint occurrence of different crises. The latest 
example of a triple crisis2 is the global financial crisis in 2007–2008 (GFC), which 
provided light during the darkest phase of the economic downturn throughout 
the world. The consequences of financial crises are not limited to output loss and 
employment loss, but also include socio political-psychological imbalances that 
can destroy economic and social stability (Hutchison and Noy, 2006). Due to these 
multidimensional consequences, predicting the leading factors of a financial crisis 
is a major challenge for policymakers, and the difficulties are amplified by the 
dynamic nature of the financial crisis.
Financial crises are costly in terms of depth and duration.3 Table 1 shows that, 
in terms of duration and cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) loss, the GFC, 
as a percentage, was more costly than all the financial events from 1880 to 2007. 
Apart from GDP loss, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) emphasize the problems with 
creditworthiness and bankruptcy spillover during a financial crisis. Claessens 
and Kose (2013) explain that the low ability to service debt can act as the seed for 
future crises, due to the collapse in output caused by the loss in creditworthiness. 
Similarly, Kaminsky et al. (1998) consider decreased credit ratings, loss of reserves, 
and increases in the cost of borrowing as crucial consequences of a financial crisis. 
Further, financial crises lead to sharp drops in real wages and employment and the 
deterioration of social and economic infrastructure (Gupta et al., 2003).
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4 The word contagion means the spread of market disturbances observed through comovements in 
exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and capital flows. 
5  This hypothesis offers an explanation for contagion, wherein a financial crisis in one region is a 
wake-up call for investors in another region who assess their investment based on fundamentals. See 
Goldstein (1998) for more details.
6 The GFC originated in the United States, but became a global shock, whose consequences affected 
most economies. This event led the world economy into a recession and can be compared to the 
Great Depression of 1929. For more details, see Imbs (2010).
In the mean time, two forms of globalization, trade and financial integration, 
have created fear among investors since the GFC due to the possibility of 
contagion.4 Given an integrated economy, the balance sheet channel assisted by 
the so-called wake-up call hypothesis5 (Goldstein, 1998) and the “unholy trinity 
of financial contagion” (Kaminsky et al., 2003) exacerbate the international 
transmission of shocks. Following an adverse shock in one economy, financial 
intermediaries operating in other economies are forced to correct their balance 
sheet by adjusting their equity-to-debt ratio. In this context, due to the transmission 
of shocks, credit availability in both economies declines, and integrated economies 
will face similar financial turbulence. The stronger the balance sheet channel, the 
stronger the transmission will be (Davis, 2014). Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000) highlight the importance of the international bank lending channel as an 
international transmission mechanism. Further, Imbs (2010) identifies financial 
linkages among economies as directly responsible for the transmission of the 
GFC and the reason a housing bubble and subprime crisis in the United States 
became “the first global recession in decades.”6 This transmission of financial crisis 
has highlighted the role of financial contagion in driving the consequences, and 
it seems to be effective in identifying future events, even if a country does not 
have a direct linkage with the crisis-affected country. Even if the argument against 
Table 1. 
Duration and Depth of Financial Crisis
This table provides a broad comparison of crises based on duration and depth, collected from Bordo et al. (2001) and 
Cecchetti et al. (2009). The average duration of crisis in an year is around 2.4, and the depth ranges from 5.2% to 20% 
during the costliest crises that occurred in the world from 1880-2008. 
Period/Events
Avg. Duration of Crisis in 
Years
Avg. Crisis Depth (In terms 
of cumulative GDP loss 
relative to peak in percent)
1880-1913 (Barings crisis of 1890, 
New York Panic of 1907)
2.4 9.8
1919-1939 (Great Depression) 2.4 13.4
1945-1971 1.8 5.2
1973-1997 (Latin American crisis 
of the 1980sthe , ERM crisis of 
1992 , the Asian and Russian 
crisis of 1997-98)
2.5-2.6 7.8-8.3
2007-08 (Global financial crisis 
of 2008)
2.5 20
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contagion had existed before 2008 in the consideration of contagious variables in 
policy action (Berg et al., 2004; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010), the major transition 
in the world economy caused by the GFC reignited the fear of financial contagion, 
motivating the search for instruments to recognize the signs.
To identify the leading indicators of a financial crisis, governments, banks, and 
international financial institutions have especially emphasized the construction of 
early warning models (EWMs)7 to fend against the crisis prior to its occurrence or 
to dampen the consequences if not completely avoided. However, these models 
were unable to predict the GFC (Davis and Karim, 2008; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 
2012; Christofides et al., 2016). In this context, the following questions arise: 1) 
Are current EWMs capable of predicting future financial events? 2) Will there be 
an ironic repetition of “this time is different”?8 3) Can crisis generation models 
capture the dynamic behavior of a financial crisis? 4) Do existing EWMs require 
augmentation?
The successful prediction of a financial crisis depends solely on the ability of 
EWMs to identify the leading indicators of financial turbulence. EWMs are needed 
to predict vulnerability events and are helpful in accurately framing warnings to 
predict whether an event will turn into a crisis or to minimize the consequences if 
an event cannot be completely avoided (IMF, 2010). The careful implementation 
of EWMs can be helpful in policy formulation in maintaining the stability of an 
economy. The development of an accurate and reliable EWM is a challenging task 
for policymakers to obtain an accurate signal to avoid the occurrence of financial 
turbulence or to mitigate the consequences. Greater EWM accuracy will result in 
lower costs associated with financial crisis, and vice versa. The failure of EWMs 
in predicting financial crises not only will have costly consequences, but will 
also raise questions about the efficiency of the EWMs themselves within their 
operating framework. However, the irony of this time being different has created 
more difficulty in the construction of EWMs for policymakers. Nonetheless, 
existing EWMs must be augmented to accurately predict financial crises. In this 
scenario, we propose a future agenda for constructing EWMs that could enhance 
their efficiency.
Our study is motivated by the incidence of the GFC, an event that the existing 
EWMs failed to forecast. First, the consequences of the failure of EWMs in 
predicting financial crises is more costly if the EWM fails to predict a crisis than 
if a crisis is predicted but does not occur (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006). If the 
event was predicted, then the economy will be aware of the future occurrence 
of the event and preventive measures are implemented prior to its occurrence. 
Conversely, if a crisis is not predicted, then the unnoticed occurrence of financial 
turbulence will have lead to the EWMs’ complete failure. In this case, the efficiency 
of EWMs is in doubt, since whether these models are really capable of predicting 
financial crises is in question (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010, 2011). 
7 The IMF (2002) explains early warning systems as an approach to the identification of vulnerabilities/
causative factors of financial crisis in the economy and useful in predicting future financial events. 
8 Every financial crisis is different by nature and difficult to identify by following past patterns of financial crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) explain this concept in more detail.
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Second, theoretical crisis generation models also lose their predictive powers 
in identifying explanatory variables that effectively driven financial crises in the 
past. This demonstrates the existence of new variables that are not included among 
existing explanatory variables for financial crises. Further, a fourth-generation 
crisis model is needed to include stem variables in the EWMs, to enhance their 
efficiency (Candelon et al., 2014). Finally, the dynamic nature of financial crises 
in today’s globalized world has highlighted the need to augment current EWMs 
so that they will be able to not only capture the dynamic nature of financial 
turbulence, but also enhance their efficiency in predicting events. In this context, 
this paper tries to answer the following questions: 1) How can the effectiveness of 
EWMs be enhanced? 2) How can a new agenda for the construction of EWMs be 
framed?
Our approach in this study is as follows. First, we document the history of 
EWMs and their theoretical background. Second, we focus on the need for a new 
agenda in relation to the failure of the EWMs, the dynamic nature of financial 
crises, and the irony of this time being different. Finally, we propose a new agenda 
consisting of the need for hybrid measures of financial crisis, for a fourth-generation 
crisis model to capture stem variables, and for the inclusion of interconnectedness 
variables in the EWMs. 
In the line with this approach, we followed several steps: (1) We identify the 
literature related to EWMs. This search resulted in 62 papers in journals (IMF 
Economic Review, Journal of International Money and Finance, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Review of International Economics, International 
Journal of Finance and Economics, Journal of Financial Stability, Journal of Applied 
Economics, Journal of Applied Economics, Journal of Monetary Economics and Banking, 
European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Surveys, Open Economic Review, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, and American Economic Review), 19 working papers 
from international institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, the Bank for International Settlements, and the 
European Central Bank), seven chapters and discussion papers from banks and 
other financial institutions (the Czech National Bank and the National Bureau of 
Economic Research), four occasional and discussion papers (the Bank of Finland 
and the Reserve Bank of India), nine books from different publishers (MIT Press, 
University of Chicago Press, Princeton University Press, and the Institute for 
International Economics), one conference paper, and one PhD dissertation. This 
filter technique can be attributed to the steps of EWMs; the occurrence of the GFC, 
which weakened the predictive power of EWMs; and theoretical arguments for 
improving the efficiency of EWMs. (2) We focus on the reasons for the failure of 
EWMs in line with the GFC, the most costly financial event that ever occurred. 
(3) Finally, we propose a future agenda for the construction of EWMs to overcome 
the lacuna associated with existing EWMs.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, this study could 
be the first attempt to document the history of EWMs with their theoretical 
background. Second, it is the first to propose a future agenda for the construction 
of EWMs based on the inclusion of all three stages. Third, the proposed agenda 
complements the ideas of the dynamic nature (Eichengreen, 2003; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009a), joint occurrence (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), and financial 
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019462
contagion (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010; Imbs, 2010) associated with financial 
crises. Finally, this study is in line with that of Claessens and Kose (2013) and 
Peltonen et al. (2015), who emphasize the nature of spillover/contagion as being 
appropriate in designing crisis mitigation and response policy and potentially 
enhancing the efficiency of EWMs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a brief 
overview of EWMs and their historical evolution. Section III demonstrates the 
need for a new agenda for the construction of EWMs for financial crises. Section IV 
presents the proposed agenda for the construction of EWMs. Finally, Section V 
concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF EWMS
Kindleberger (1978) introduces the EWM and attempts to determine its importance. 
Salant and Henderson (1978) then develop a model that can predict a financial 
crisis when speculator self-interest is leading to a market-based dismantling 
of unsustainable policies. The purpose of EWMs is to detect the vulnerabilities 
responsible for financial crises to allow for the implementation of preventive 
policies (IMF, 2010).
The construction of an EWM involves three procedures. First, the primary step 
in formulating a model is to define financial crisis. Second, the explanatory variables 
are selected, that is, those variables that are very likely to lead a financial crisis 
if they cross a threshold. Finally, various econometric/statistical methodologies 
provide the models a finishing touch. Given all these stages, an EWM is thereby 
set to identify the leading indicators of a financial event.
EWMs face several challenges during their construction. First, defining a 
financial crisis is always difficult, because of the different forms of crisis in different 
countries over different periods (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Abiad, 2003). Second, the 
explanatory variables for the financial crisis must be identified, along with the 
underlying economic reasoning (Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld; 1986; Radelet and 
Sachs, 1998). Third, the appropriate choice of statistical/econometric methodology 
must be made or because that can alter the results.
A.	Definitions	of	the	Financial	Crisis
The financial crisis can be classified into two broad categories, quantitative and 
qualitative. The quantitative category includes currency crises and sudden stops, 
where the crisis can be measured quantitatively. The qualitative category includes 
banking and debt crises, where the crisis can be measured using a judgmental 
definition (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). The literature on EWMs has suggested 
several definitions of financial crises, including currency crises (Frankel and Rose, 
1996; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998; Berg and Pattillo, 1999a, 1999b; Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999), sudden stops (Calvo, 1998; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 2000), 
banking crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2012), and sovereign debt crises (Manasse 
and Roubini, 2009; Dawood et al., 2017). Sometimes crises are correlated with 
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each other and emerge as a twin crisis9 (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) or triple 
crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b), which becomes difficult to define in a simple 
manner.
A1. Currency Crisis
A currency crisis is defined as a speculative attack on the foreign exchange value 
of a currency that either results in a sharp depreciation or forces the authorities to 
defend the currency by selling foreign exchange reserves or raising the domestic 
interest rate (Claessens and Kose, 2013). Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency 
crisis as a normal depreciation of 25% or more that is at least 10% greater than 
the depreciation in the preceding year. Similarly, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
(1998) define a currency crisis as involving, in addition to a depreciation of 25% 
or more, at least a doubling of the rate of depreciation the previous year and a 
rate of depreciation below 40% that of the previous year, to avoid capturing the 
large exchange rate fluctuations associated with periods of high inflation. In this 
context, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use an index of exchange rate pressure10 
to measure currency crises. Examples of currency crises include the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system in 1971–1973, the crisis of the British pound in 1976, 
the breakdown of the European exchange rate mechanism in 1992–1993, the Latin 
American tequila crisis following Mexico’s peso devaluation in 1994–1995, the 
East Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, and the GFC.
A2. Sudden Stops
A financial crisis characterized by sudden stops is due to disruptions in the 
supply of external financing. This concept of sudden stops was first proposed 
by Calvo (1998) and is defined as a large and unexpected halt in the financing 
of the current account deficit, triggered by an systemic external event, such as 
a generalized increase in sovereign spreads throughout emerging markets. The 
author’s argument is that economies experiencing large current account deficits 
are potentially exposed to large and unexpected stops in the financing of the 
current account, or sudden stops. Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
identify the sudden reversal of capital flows as a potential cause of a liquidity 
crisis. Sudden stops can be captured by a spike in emerging market bond index 
spreads. Examples of sudden stops can be traced back to crisis events such as the 
Mexican crisis of 1994 (the tequila effect), the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–
1998, and the Russian crisis of 1998, where capital inflows ended with sudden 
stops and also resulted in capital outflow.
9 A twin crisis in year t is a banking crisis in year t combined with a currency crisis during the period [t - 1, t + 
1]. For more details, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
10 The index of exchange rate market pressure is a weighted average of exchange rate changes and 
reserve changes. A financial crisis can be identified as when the index exceeds a country-specific 
threshold level. The index takes into account exchange rate depreciation and reserve losses, with 
equal weighting to influence the index. See Eichengreen et al. (1995) for an overview.
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A3. Banking Crisis
In a systemic banking crisis, actual or potential bank runs11 and failures can induce 
banks to suspend the convertibility of their liabilities or compel the government 
to intervene to prevent this by extending liquidity and capital assistance on a 
large scale (Claessens and Kose, 2013). As a bank run starts, it generates its own 
momentum, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy: as more people withdraw their 
deposits, the likelihood of default increases, which encourages further withdrawals. 
This can destabilize a bank and lead to its bankruptcy if it cannot liquidate assets 
quickly enough to cover its short-term liabilities, because a bank’s investment 
or loan consists of long-term deposits, whereas liabilities consist of short-term 
deposits. When a bank run becomes complementary to bank run psychology,12 
it makes the situation more difficult for the banking sector. In a nonfundamental 
way, bank runs could arise because of the expectations of individual depositors 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). On the other hand, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) date 
the beginning of banking crises by two types of events: first, bank runs that lead 
to the bank’s closure and, second, the merger or takeover by the public sector of 
one or more financial institutions. The Ecuador banking crisis of 1998, the Russian 
crisis of 1998, and the UK rescue package of 2015 are a few examples of banking 
crises.
A4. Sovereign Debt Crisis
The inability or unwillingness to pay, that is, default, is the primary source of a 
debt crisis, which increases the probability of losing all the money that has been 
given to or invested in a country. In the absence of gunboat diplomacy,13 lenders 
cannot seize collateral from another country, or at least from a sovereign, if it 
refuses to pay its debt obligations. In the absence of an enforcement mechanism—
that is, the analog of domestic bankruptcy, economic reasons, and the absence of 
legal arguments and so on—a debt crisis is a matter of great concern (Claessens 
and Kose, 2013). However, Kletzer and Wright (2000) argue that a country defaults 
when the opportunity cost of not being able to borrow again is low and the terms 
of trade are good and are expected to remain so. Countries default in bad times 
to smooth consumption, but few countries are able to escape default on domestic 
debt, with often adverse economic consequences. An empirical study on debt 
intolerance and serial default by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) suggests that safe 
debt thresholds hinge on country-specific factors, such as a country’s record of 
default and inflation; when the external debt level of an emerging country is above 
11 Bank runs arise because of panic, rather than a bank’s absolute insolvency. A run occurs when a large number 
of customers withdraw their deposits because they believe the bank is or could become insolvent (Simorangkir, 
2006, 2011; Anwar and Ali, 2018).
12 The bank run psychology is associated with bank runs, where the depositors are not willing to be 
the last person to withdraw money from the bank if they perceive vulnerability in the banking sector 
and the bank can default any time. This is more of a psychological than an economic phenomenon.
equal weighting to influence the index. See Eichengreen et al. (1995) for an overview.
13 Forcing a debtor to pay back a loan using threats about the consequences of or creating the 
circumstances for war is a bureaucratic political decision.
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30–35% of the gross national product, the likelihood of an external debt crisis rises 
substantially. Examples of sovereign debt crises are the Brazilian crisis of 1991, 
Argentina’s default of 2001, and Greece in 2015.
Currency crises have a close association with financial crises and are often 
associated with banking crises. The joint occurrence of a currency and a banking 
crisis together is called a twin crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), and if the 
twin crisis occurs together with a sovereign debt crisis, it becomes a triple crisis. 
Examples of twin crises include the crises in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Korea from 1997 to 1998, and the GFC comprised a triple event.
In the presence of multiple types of financial crisis, we use the broader term 
financial	crisis in this paper because our objective is to frame an agenda for EWMs, 
with a focus on improving their effectiveness. The use of any different term will 
limit the concept of EWMs to a specific type of crisis. The use of the term financial	
crisis is in line with the occurrence of multiple financial events and the interlinkages 
among various financial events.
B. Potential Candidates for Explaining Financial Crisis: The Search for Regressors
The identification of explanatory variables for financial crises is the second step 
of EWM construction. The factors that determine a financial crisis can be derived 
theoretically, empirically, or both. Theoretical models suggest three generations 
of financial crisis models for the fundamental explanation of crises, while the 
empirical literature provides various variables related to financial crises.
B1. First-generation Crisis Model
The first theoretical model associated with financial crisis, popularly known as 
the first-generation crisis model, is that of Krugman (1979). The author explains 
that the government’s inconsistent policies, such as financing the budget deficit 
by printing excessive money under a fixed exchange rate system, will gradually 
lead to low levels of international reserve holdings and a currency crisis. Overall, 
this model identifies weak fundamentals, such as budget and trade deficits, and 
uses the appreciation of the real exchange rate as the primary indicator of first-
generation speculative attacks. Flood and Garber (1984) augment Krugman’s 
model by generating a distribution of the size and timing of the speculative 
attack, broadly known as the KFG model in the crisis literature. The first empirical 
study using the KFG model is that of Blanco and Garber (1986), who analyze the 
currency devaluations in Mexico in 1976 and 1981–1982. The authors find that a 
speculative attack induces the policy authority to implement a preemptive and 
state-dependent currency devaluation to help mitigate reserve losses. Similarly, 
a higher trade deficit signals a crisis, since it leads to currency depreciation and 
renders the current account deficit unsustainable (Roubini and Wachtel, 1998) and 
subject to greater vulnerability (Bucevska, 2011). Following the first-generation 
crisis model, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that growth rates in the money 
supply and credit that exceed certain thresholds increase the likelihood of a 
banking crisis. Similarly, Goldstein et al. (2000) find an appreciation of the real 
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exchange rate, a decline in equity prices, a drop in exports, and a high ratio of 
broad money to international reserves to be major determinants of financial crisis.
The first-generation model failed to determine the cause of the European 
exchange rate mechanism crisis. In Europe, the fundamentals were quite healthy 
and showed no signs of weakness, but the crisis still occurred. As a result, a new 
generation of crisis model evolved.
B2. Second-generation Crisis Model
After the failure of the first-generation model, a second-generation crisis model 
was proposed by Obstfeld (1986, 1996) that implies that a crisis can occur even 
given strong fundamentals. The occurrence of a crisis ultimately depends on the 
self-fulfilling prophecy that investors will attack the currency if they expect others 
will do the same. Accordingly, doubts about whether the government is willing to 
maintain its exchange rate target can lead to multiple equilibria, and a speculative 
currency attack can take place and succeed even if the current policy is consistent 
with the exchange rate commitment. Policies implemented to maintain a particular 
exchange rate level, such as those increasing domestic interest rates, can also raise 
costs by dampening economic activity or increasing bank funding costs. The main 
innovation of the second-generation model consists of identifying the role that 
the expectations of economic agents could play in precipitating currency crises. In 
the empirical literature, Flood et al. (1996) show how to recast the KFG model to 
account for interest rate pegging, whereas Chang and Velaso (2000) argue that the 
government’s guarantee of shifts in expected arbitrage14 has led to financial crisis.
The second-generation crisis model failed to explain the East-Asian financial 
crisis, cause by balance sheet deterioration and capital account liberalization in 
the presence of a weak financial system. Finally, a third-generation crisis model 
evolved to explain the nature of the financial events experienced by East Asian 
economies.
B3. Third-generation Crisis Model
In the wake of the 1997–1998 East Asian financial crisis, the emergence of the third-
generation crisis model highlights how financial liberalization and government 
guarantees of private sector liabilities lead to moral hazard15 and unsustainable 
fiscal deficits, which become the leading factors of a financial crisis. This model 
explores how rapid balance sheet deteriorations associated with fluctuations in 
asset prices, including exchange rates, can trigger currency crises (Radelet and 
Sachs, 1998). McKinnon and Pill (1996) argue that capital flows in the financial 
liberalization of an unregulated banking sector can cause a financial crisis. When 
a country opens its capital account, it becomes an important receiver of foreign 
capital in the initial period. If the domestic financial system is not healthy enough to 
14 Arbitrage is the process of buying and selling the same product in different markets to reap the benefits from 
the price differential.
15 Moral hazard is a phenomenon wherein borrowers engage in risky behavior, knowing that someone 
else will pay for their mistakes.
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16 The premature opening of a capital account will lead to a sudden increase in capital inflow. The premature 
opening of a capital account in a weak financial system of low institutional quality can lead to the outflow of 
foreign capital as well as domestic capital. This situation is called the overborrowing syndrome (McKinnon 
and Pill, 1996).
absorb it, this will create a problem such as overborrowing syndrome16 (McKinnon 
and Pill, 1996). The details of the explanatory variables for all three generations of 
crisis models are reported in Table 2.
Table 2. 
Explanatory Variables of Financial Crises
This table presents details of studies on the explanatory variables of financial crises, identified by different crisis 
generation models and supporters of crisis generation models. 
Crisis-generation model Supporters Explanatory variables
First-generation crisis model Krugman (1979) Fixed exchange rate
Blanco and Garber (1986) Fiscal deficit
Roubini and Watchtel (1998) Inflation
Trade deficit
Declining foreign reserves
Growth rate of money
Credit to reserve ratio
Second-generation crisis model Obstfeld (1986) Including the explanatory 
variables of the first-generation 
model,
Obstfeld (1996) Govt. guarantees for arbitrage 
expectation shift
Flood et al. (1996) Interest rate pegging
Chang and Velaso (2000)
Third-generation crisis model McKinnon and Pill (1996) Including explanatory variables 
of the above two models,
Radelet and Sachs (1998) Capital account liberalization
Growth in M2 multiplier
Growth in credit/GDP
Ratio of domestic bank loan to 
GDP
Liabilities/GDP ratio
Fall in bank deposits/GDP ratio
Contagion dummy
Short-term capital flows/GDP
In the presence of a variety of explanatory variables in line with the crisis generation 
models, EWMs are set to provide the predictive indicators of a financial crisis, 
using various statistical/econometric methodologies.
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C. Statistical/ Econometric Methodologies
The third stage of EWMs consists of statistical/econometric analyses for a given 
crisis definition and set of explanatory variables. Three conventional empirical 
approaches are associated with EWMs: the indicator approach (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999) and/or signaling approach (Kaminsky et al., 1998) and the limited 
dependent variable probit/logit model (Eichengreen et al.,1995; Frankel and Rose, 
1996). Other categories of approaches include the use of innovative techniques for 
the identification and explanation of financial crisis, such as Markov switching 
models (Cerra and Saxena, 2002; Martinez, 2002; Abiad, 2003), artificial neural 
networks (ANNs) and genetic algorithms (Nag and Mitra, 1999; Apoteker and 
Barthelemy, 2000), binary recursive trees (Ghosh and Ghosh, 2003; Frankel and 
Wei, 2005), and unit root testing (Virtanen et al., 2016).
C1. Indicator and Signal Approaches
The first category of approaches is nonparametric and includes the indicator 
approach and/or signal approach, introduced by Kaminsky et al. (1998) and 
augmented by Bruggermann and Linne (1999) and Edison (2003). Given a number 
of leading indicators of a crisis, these approaches determine the threshold level 
beyond which an event is classified as a crisis. The approaches face serious 
difficulties, because it is not possible to determine the significance of the indicators 
directly, since thresholds are determined in sample. Determination of the optimal 
threshold level involves striking a balance between failing to predict a crisis that 
actually occurs (type I error) and predicting a crisis that does not actually occur 
(type II error). Accordingly, if the threshold is set too low, then the indicators will 
catch all the crises but will produce many false signals (noise). Conversely, if the 
threshold is too high, the indicator will never issue a false alarm, but it will miss all 
the crises. Hence, for each variable, the optimal threshold is selected to optimize 
the signal-to-noise ratio. Another solution is to rank the usefulness of the indicators 
in declining order of their signal-to-noise ratios (more details are reported in Table 
3). Further, the out-of-sample performance17 of the signal approach has been tested 
by Berg and Patillo (1999a, 1999b), Bussiere and Mudler (2000), and Berg et al. 
(2005), who find it provides a moderate level of prediction of financial crises.
Although the signaling approach occupies a prominent place in warning 
about a signal, we still drop it because of a few shortcomings. First, when each 
variable is evaluated separately, it neglects interrelated sets of conditions. Second, 
it ignores potential correlations between different indicators. Third, this approach 
issues only binary signals, which are either that an indicator is above its threshold, 
denoting a signal, or below its threshold, denoting no signal of a potential crisis. 
Consequently, there is no measure of the strength of the signal that is potentially 
related to the extent to which it exceeds its threshold.
17 Out-of-sample forecast performance is used to evaluate the forecasting performance of a statistical test and 
is generally considered more trustworthy than evidence based on in-sample performance, since in-sample 
performance can be sensitive to outliers and data mining.
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Table 3. 
Signal-to-noise Ratio Matrix
The table reports the noise-to-signal ratio matrix associated with the signal approach (Kaminsky et al., 1999). The 
cell named A indicates that a signal is considered accurate if a variable signal and a crisis occur in the following 24 
months. On the other hand, the cell named B is said to be a false alarm if a variable signal and no crisis occurs in that 
time frame. Hence, a perfect indicator would only have entries in cells named A and D. In general, the noise-to-signal 
ratio for any indicator is traced by the number of entries:
[B (B+D)] / [A (A+C)]
It is the ratio of false signals to all possible bad signals divided by the ratio of good signals to all possible good signals. 
The extreme noisy indicator would have few entries in cells named A and D, and more in cells named B and C.
C2. Logit and Probit Model
The second category of approaches, that is, linear regression or limited dependent 
variable estimation methods such as probit and logit techniques, are the most 
popular category in the literature. Eichengreen et al. (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), 
and Sach et al. (1996) are among the first studies to have used these techniques to 
test the statistical significance of various indicators in determining the probability 
of a future financial crisis. Eichengreen et al. (1996) adopts a probit model to predict 
currency crises and finds that speculative attacks on a fixed exchange rate play a 
significant role in predicting the incidence of a currency crisis. Further, Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) analyze factors associated with the emergence 
of systemic banking crises and find banking distress to be associated with low 
economic growth, high inflation, and high interest rates. Similarly, Joyce (2011), 
Frost and Tilburg (2014), Hamdi and Jlassi (2014), and Kulkarni and Kamaiah 
(2015) have used this method extensively to predict financial crises. Additionally, 
Berg and Pattillo (1999b) highlight the advantages of probability models to 
overcome the difficulties of a signal approach. First, they provide a framework 
for the separately testing of the statistical significance of individual explanatory 
variables. Second, they consider the correlation between the regressors and 
combine informative indicators into a single composite indicator of crisis. Third, 
their model allows for the estimation of the probability of a crisis. Fourth, it allows 
for the introduction of various functional forms between the binominal dependent 
variable and explanatory variables.
Although logit/probit models have been extensively used, they are still subject 
to shortcomings. First, the definition of financial crisis as a dummy variable leads 
to an ad hoc assumption when constructing the model. Second, this approach is 
subject to the loss of information. Third, single-step estimation can also lead to 
biased results.
C3. Markov Switching Approach
The Markov switching approach was pioneered by Jeanne and Masson (2000) and 
used by Cerra and Saxena (2002) to model contagion in the context of Indonesia 
Description
A crisis occurs in the 
following 24 months
No crisis occurs in the 
following 24 months
Indicator issues a signal A B
The indicator does not issue a signal C D
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in 1997. Mariano et al. (2000) and Abiad (2002, 2003) were the first to use this 
approach in EWMs and introduced it as an alternative approach for predicting a 
currency crisis.
The Markov switching approach of Abiad (2003) applies time-varying 
probabilities in modeling a speculative attack, which allows the model to utilize 
information involved in exchange rate dynamics. Abiad highlights the advantages 
of this approach over previous ones, such as its avoidance of the many ad hoc 
assumptions required by previous models, as well as the loss of information 
caused by the transformation of variables into binary crisis dummy variables in 
the logit/probit model. First, Abiad’s Markov switching approach can be derived 
directly from the second-generation crisis model. Second, the approach includes an 
endogenous crisis determination period rather than the dummy assigned by other 
models. Third, easily forecast and multistep crisis events can be calculated. Fourth, 
the inclusion of latent variables captures the exchange rate dynamics. Fifth, the 
approach determines the longevity of probable crisis period and does not require 
exclusion windows. Finally, the approach focuses on a set of reliable observable 
variables, multi-period forecasting horizons, and an empirical framework for 
analyzing the contagion effect of the crisis to improve short-term forecasts. The 
model’s major weakness is its difficulty of creation. A powerful program is needed 
to run the algorithms, since they are not part of any econometric package. Further, 
this approach is highly computational, with difficulties in the case of no switching 
and failing to cooperate with more explanatory variables.
C4.	Artificial	Neural	Networks	and	Genetic	Algorithms
The ANN approach is capable of learning through a process of trial and error that 
can be approximated as a statistical estimation of model parameters. The use of 
neural network analysis in the context of EWMs is due to Nag and Mitra (1999), 
who constructed an early warning system for currency crises and compare its 
performance to the indicator approach using monthly data for Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand in 1980–1998. Similarly, Frank and Schmied (2004) suggest predicting 
speculative attacks by using the ANN approach and test the predictability of crises 
in Russia and Brazil. In addition, Apoteker and Barthelemy (2000) use a genetic 
algorithm to fend against sudden changes in economic indicators to improve the 
predictive capacity of the risk ratings of risk monitoring services in emerging 
economies.
The primary advantages associated with ANNs are their flexible specification 
and ability to capture complex interactions among variables. Nonetheless, 
disadvantages of the ANN approach include greater danger of overfitting, 
compared to other methodologies, the lack of coefficient estimation, and 
complicated interactions between the variables. Finally, it is difficult to identify 
potential indicators that are abnormal or the drivers of forecasting probabilities.
C5. Binary Recursive Trees and Unit Root Tests
Ghosh and Ghosh (2003) use a binary recursive tree to examine the role of 
structural factors, corporate financing structure, and macroeconomic variables in 
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causing a currency crisis for 40 industrialized and emerging countries from 1987 
to 1999. The authors find that structural vulnerabilities played an important role 
in leading to a deep currency crisis and there were complex interactions between 
these structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances. Although a binary 
recursive tree allows for interactions between the various explanatory variables, 
accounting for structural factors that do not change much, it will be difficult for it 
to generate a warning and it will thus have limited application in the real world. 
A binary recursive tree is similar to an ANN, in that it requires computational 
programming to identify the interlinkages between the structural vulnerability 
and macroeconomic variables.
In a different approach, Virtanen et al. (2016) use unit root–based EWMs for the 
ex ante prediction of financial crises for 15 European Union countries, combining 
early warning signals from multiple time series into a composite indicator. They 
find that unit root–based methods are successful at predicting financial crises, in 
both in-sample and out-of-sample estimations. Since the unit root tests of EWMs 
are computed using a set of parametric values such as window lags and numbers 
of lags, they are subject to determinative choices of these values and specification 
uncertainty.
In the presence of a variety of statistical/econometric methodologies of EWMs, 
it is difficult for academicians and policymakers to choose a suitable method for the 
empirical exercise. However, the choice of empirical method in handling EWMs 
depends only upon the researcher’s perspective. The details of the statistical and 
empirical methodologies of EWMs are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. 
Statistical/Econometric Methodologies of EWM
The table reports the various empirical methodologies used for the third stage of the early warning models. The table 
covers the details about model types, authors, methodology, and limitations of the various methodologies used for 
the construction of early warning models. The * denotes the founder of the empirical methodologies.
Type Authors Methodology Limitations
Indicator and Signal 
Approach
Kaminsky-Linzondo-
Reinhart (1998)*
Bruggermann and 
Linne (1999) 
Edison (2003)
Threshold level of an 
indicator.
-    Neglect 
interrelations.
-     It’s a warning, no 
signal about crisis 
appearance. 
Logit and Probit Model
Eichengreen et al. 
(1995)*
Frankel and Rose (1996)
Sach et al. (1996)
Eichengreen et al. (1996)
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998)
Dummy for financial 
crisis.
Statistical testing and 
statistical significance of 
individual variables. 
Estimation of 
probability of occurring 
a financial crisis. 
-    Ad-hoc assumption
-    Loss of information
-    Single step 
estimation
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Table 4. 
Statistical/Econometric Methodologies of EWM (Continued)
Type Authors Methodology Limitations
Markov-Switching 
Approach
Mariano et al. (2000)* 
Abiad (2002) 
Cerra and Saxena (2002)
Abiad (2003)
Allows for time-varying 
probabilities. 
Multi-stage estimation.
Endogenous 
determination of crisis 
period. 
Inclusion of latent 
variable. 
-    Difficulty in model 
creation.
-    Highly computation 
and need strong 
programing 
language.
-     Not a part of 
econometric 
packages.
-    Fails to cooperate 
more explanatory 
variable. 
Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN) and Genetic 
Algorithms
Nag and Mitra (1999)*
Apoteker and 
Barthelemy (2000)
Frank and Schmied 
(2004)
Neural network 
predictability.
Genetic algorithms.
-     Danger of 
overfitting.
-    No coefficient 
estimation.
-     Difficulty in 
identifying 
indicators. 
-     Complicated 
interaction.
Binary Recursive Tree Ghosh and Ghosh 
(2003)*
Decision-theoretic 
classification technique. 
-    Difficulty in 
generating 
warnings. 
Unit-Root Test Based Virtanen et al. (2016)* Convert multiple time 
series into composite 
indicators. 
Window lags
-    Exposed to 
deterministic choice.
-    Specification 
uncertainty.
EWMs evolved over time, given various definitions, explanatory variables, and 
statistical/econometric methodologies. Starting with the definition of empirical 
methodologies, EWMs needed to be augmented. The failure of the first-generation 
crisis model to explain the European exchange rate mechanism crisis resulted 
in the second-generation model, and the failure of the second-generation model 
to explain the East Asian financial crisis resulted in the evolution of the third-
generation crisis model. Such evolution has not only improved the predictive 
power of EWMs, but also supported the further need for EWMs, even after an 
event. The failure of EWMs to predict national or regional financial events has 
been questioned before as well. Therefore, different crisis generation models 
have evolved to further improve their predictive power. In the context of GFC, 
the complex nature of the occurrence and quick transmission of shocks has led 
to the failure of EWMs worldwide. Finally, this is not the time to question the 
general effectiveness of EWMs; rather, the effectiveness of existing models should 
be improved by eradicating the lacunae associated with them. In this paper, we 
provide a research agenda to enhance the effectiveness of existing EWMs.
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III. SEEDS FOR THE BIRTH OF A NEW AGENDA
A1.	Motivation	from	the	Failure	of	Identification
EWMs to analyze and predict leading indicators or the accurate timing of the 
occurrence of a crises are essential for policy formulation. The failure of EWMs 
to identify the GFC (Davis and Karim, 2008; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010, 2012; 
Christofides et al., 2016) has raised questions about their efficiency within their 
operational framework. However, the solution is not to abandon the existing 
EWMs, but, rather, to eradicate the weaknesses associated with them, enhancing 
their efficiency. Further, the accuracy of early models cannot be underestimated, 
since they accurately predicted the occurrence of a financial crisis in the case 
of the Chilean crisis in 1982, Brazil in 1994, the Korean crisis in 1997–1998, the 
Argentinean crisis in 2001, and the Turkish case in 2001.
Stagewise specifications in the EWMs should be carried out with caution, since 
the stage’s accuracy will determine the final accuracy. Given the dynamic nature of 
financial crises, it is harder to define a financial crisis and identify the explanatory 
variables in comparison to choosing a method of statistical/econometric analysis 
to associate with the models. A more accurate specification of the operating 
framework of EWMs in the first two stages will lead to accuracy depending on 
the choice of statistical/econometric methodologies. The failure of EWMs to at 
least notice the GFC (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2012) clearly indicates their failure at 
every stage of the operating framework. Finally, to augment the existing EWMs, 
we need to augment all the stages according to the dynamic nature of the financial 
crisis.
A2.	Dynamic	Nature	of	Crisis	Models
The evolution from past crises, indicating changes in the leading factors causing 
the financial crisis over various periods (Eichengreen, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009a). Thus, the formation of policy to control financial crises based on the 
leading indicators of an earlier form of financial crisis might not result in efficient 
policy actions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Further, the efficiency of policy tools in 
controlling financial crises depends entirely on how accurately the financial crisis 
is defined and the nature of the occurrence identified.
The next question that arises is whether the current measurement of 
the financial crisis is efficient in its identification procedure or whether any 
augmentation is needed to enhance the performance of such measurements. The 
financial crisis in the late 1970s in the Latin American countries emphasizes the role 
of weak macroeconomic fundamentals, whereas the case of European countries 
in the 1980s emphasizes multiple equilibria and the self-fulfilling prophecies of 
investors as the leading indicators (Eichengreen, 2003). The mismanagement of 
capital flows, moral hazard, and private sector liabilities caused the East Asian 
financial crisis in 1997–1998 (Radelet and Sachs, 2000). On the other hand, the GFC, 
was caused by subprime mortgage lending and housing bubbles. In this context, 
Rose and Spiegel (2009) identified three causes of the predictive failure of EWMs. 
First, the different causes of the 2008 crisis across countries could be the leading 
factor of the financial crisis, and, second, the GFC could be the result of a global 
shock, rather than unregulated country-specific financial and macroeconomic 
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fundamentals. Finally, the shock originated in the United States but transmitted 
across its borders.
The changing nature of financial crises must be considered to accurately 
identify upcoming financial crises. In this regard, the crisis generation models 
should be dynamic to capture the dynamic nature of crises. Additionally, there is 
no need to justify why crisis generation models should evolve over time.
A3.	The	Subprime	Lending	Crisis:	A	Burning	Example	of	this	Time	Being	Different
In the context of the subprime lending/mortgage crisis in 2007–2008, Shiller (2005) 
notes the inability of long-term domestic economic factors to explain the rise in 
housing prices since 1998, where the Case–Shiller Home Price Index18 rose to 67% 
from 1998-2006, in comparison to a normal increase from 1890 to 1998, but with 
no such change in the real GDP, population, long-term interest rate, and so forth. 
This rise in housing prices looks unsustainable and ultimately turns into a global 
financial crisis. Shiller emphasizes the role of psychological bias and social processes 
such as overoptimism, overconfidence, contagion, and herd behavior in framing 
the irrational exuberance19 that led to the crisis in the presence of media stories of 
a new era, where market participants and policymakers believed in an indefinite 
rise in housing prices in the future. Similarly, Connor et al. (2010) identifies 
irrational exuberance and related asset price bubbles as a crucial factor responsible 
for the banking crises in the United States and Ireland. On the other hand, Rajan 
(2010), in his book Fault Lines, explains that the low- and middle-income groups 
reduced their savings and increased their debt since income inequality started 
shooting up in the United States. This led to not only a temporary increment in 
private consumption and employment but also the creation of a credit bubble. The 
downturn in the housing market led to the seed of the subprime mortgage crisis in 
2007, and the rest was fostered by the expansion of debt-financed private demand, 
turning this event into the global recession of 2008. Further, Rajan (2005) blames 
misguided government policies in promoting credit expansion to households in 
the absence of adequate collateral.
This supply-side argument of the so-called Rajan (2010) hypothesis and 
the psychological-social arguments of Shiller (2005) in the context of irrational 
exuberance explain more asset bubbles in the United States. This irrational 
exuberance has increased the need for homes that consumers perceive as being 
costly in the future, whereas the credit expansion by the government through 
overindebtedness has led to the easy availability of money, which has led to further 
raising housing prices. At the same time, different financial innovations such as 
shadow banking,20 securitization, and the entry of new financial intermediaries 
have increased the likelihood of turmoil induced by the finance sector.
18 The Case–Shiller Home Price Index is the index of housing prices in the United States. Its construction 
is due to Karl Case and Robert Shiller, who measured the housing pricing boom in Boston and tried 
to describe similar trends across the United States. 
19 Irrational exuberance describes the situation in which investors’ enthusiasm becomes the reason for 
raising asset prices that are not supported by fundamentals. See Shiller (2005) for more details.
20 A shadow banking system is the term used for the system of a group of non-bank financial 
intermediaries that facilitates services similar to those of a banking system, but without being subject 
to banking regulation.
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Allen and Moessner (2011) argue that the GFC was transmitted to various 
countries through three channels: the shadow banking system, collateral squeeze21, 
and carry trade unwinding.22 The GFC differs from the global recession of 1929–
1931 because the liquidity commitment of commercial banks was a serious problem 
during the GFC, whereas the global recession in 1929 witnessed a restriction in 
channeling the liquidity created by the gold standard period. The GFC was a fiery 
example of this time being different, weakening the crisis generation models’ 
identification of the leading factors for the financial crisis. The GFC was a repetition 
of this syndrome (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) and proof of why an early warning 
system should be dynamic (Candelon et al., 2014). This situation not demonstrates 
the dynamic occurrence of a financial event, but also highlights the need for a 
new generation of models that can capture the dynamic nature of financial crises 
(Goldstein and Razin, 2013).
IV. RESEARCH AGENDA AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We now suggest a future research agenda, on the following grounds.
A1.	The	Need	for	a	Hybrid	Measure	of	Financial	Crisis
The various typologies of financial crisis have themselves created a puzzle in the 
way to define what a financial crisis is all about. A currency crisis is defined as 
a depreciation of currency of 25% or a depreciation of 15% with 10% inflation, 
whereas a banking crisis is identified by bank runs and liquidity crash. A sovereign 
debt crisis is all about the repayment of debt and defaults, whereas sudden stops 
involve the halt of capital flows, specifically in relation to emerging countries that 
finance their current account deficit using foreign capital. Differently, a balance 
of payment crisis is likely to occur in conjunction with a currency crisis and not 
considered to be a single type of financial crisis. The joint occurrence of a currency 
crisis and a banking crisis, that is, a twin crisis, will make a country’s economic 
situation worse than in a single-crisis case. Finally, the global recession of 2008 has 
its own significance in making financial crises costlier in the form of a triple crisis.
The accuracy of measuring financial crisis is a challenging task in the presence 
of various financial crisis typologies. The choice of financial crisis measurement 
is not difficult in the case of a single financial crisis event (Claessens and Kose, 
2013). Conversely, the joint occurrence of financial crises, as in twin and triple 
crises, is difficult to measure when constructing EWMs, since the mixture of 
21 A collateral squeeze is a process aimed at reducing counterparty risk where, if the borrower defaults, 
the collateral will be seized and paid to the creditor. It is part of the regulation of financial systems, 
where the loans must meet criteria for eligibility, that is, the level of collateral is decided based on 
property valuation.
22 For example, since US and European interest rates are low, Japanese investors started to sell their 
dollar and euro investments and return their money to Japan. Yen carry trade becomes unprofitable, 
and investors can lose substantial amounts if the yen rises against the dollar or euro. Consequently, 
with a rising yen, people sell their foreign investments and end their carry trades. This increases 
demand for the yen even more, causing a further rise in the yen. This is the scenario of carry trade 
unwinding.
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quantitative and qualitative measurements of financial crisis might not be accurate 
and can lead to the model’s failure (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In this context, 
with the presence of quantitative and qualitative measures of financial crisis, 
the construction of hybrid measures based on a certain weighting will be more 
productive in forecasting the future occurrence of twin or triple crises or the 
probability of leading to another form of financial crisis. 
A2.		Identifying	Potential	Explanatory	Variables	for	the	Financial	Crisis:	The	Need	for	a			
 Fourth-generation Crisis Model
The failure to identify the leading factors of crisis emphasizes the need for a 
fourth-generation crisis model to explain the leading factors of a new financial 
crisis (Goldstein and Razin, 2013). Identification of the dynamic nature of financial 
crises and inclusion of the leading factors become a difficult task, since none of 
the three crisis generation models are able to explain the leading factors that 
caused the GFC (Candelon et al., 2012, 2014). The GFC was a distinct event in 
the history of financial crises, not only in terms of depth and duration but also 
in terms of its leading factors. Economic factors alone were not able to explain 
the hike in housing prices after 1998, and psychosocial factors fostered soaring 
inequality (Shiller, 2005), which finally turned into the global financial crisis 
(Imbs, 2010). This event was triggered by misguided government policies and an 
unregulated financial system (Rajan, 2005, 2010). The crisis was difficult to foresee 
because of the distinct nature of its occurrence, which certainly requires additional 
narrative in terms of factors causing the financial crisis and identification of the 
links between psychosocial factors and macroeconomic crises. The various links 
between real estate prices, credit expansion through government policies, and 
consumer expectation–tracking theories of consumption require a clear theoretical 
framework to explain the occurrence of the housing bubble. Thus, capturing the 
dynamic nature of the financial crisis requires the fourth-generation crisis model 
to accurately identify the financial crisis, a challenging task for both academicians 
and policymakers. Specifically, the crisis generation models are related to the 
currency crisis; however, the explanatory variables follow a similar pattern in 
explaining various other forms of crisis. Further, the occurrence of twin and triple 
crises affirms that a particular explanatory variable can have predictive power for 
various financial crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). We therefore suggest the 
need for a fourth-generation crisis model. 
A3. Contagion/interconnectedness as an Explanatory Variable
The word contagion generally denotes the spread of market disturbances from one 
country to another and is a process observed through comovements in exchange 
rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and capital flows, and so forth. The GFC has 
amplified the importance of contagion, originating from the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and spreading to most countries (Imbs, 2010). In line with the failure of 
EWMs to foresee the financial crisis of 2007–2008, financial contagion has its own 
significance in predicting the financial crisis. Furthermore, Babecky et al. (2011, 
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2012) emphasize the increasing role of global factors and interconnectedness 
among markets as leading risk factors in today’s integrated world.
Examples of the channel of transmission of shocks include the role of insurance 
(Allen and Gale, 1998), the wake-up call hypothesis (Goldstein, 1998), the role of 
common creditors (Pritsker, 2013), and bank run psychology (Summers, 2000). 
Kaminsky et al. (2003) also note the role of information cascades,23 causing global 
spillover. Thus, identifying the nature of spillover is essential in the appropriate 
design of both crisis mitigation and crisis management responses (Claessens and 
Kose, 2013).
The role of contagion in transmitting financial crises while increasing trade 
and financial integration has been identified in the literature in various ways. 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) find that the contagion effect remains significant, whereas 
Fratzscher (1998) supports the contagious nature of the currency crisis with 
a comparison of the Latin American crisis with the East Asian crisis. Similarly, 
Cerra and Saxena (2002) and Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) confirm the significant 
role of contagion in transmitting shocks. Similarly, Hermansen and Rohn (2015) 
emphasize the role of global risk indicators outperforming domestic indicators in 
terms of highlighting the role of international development. Finally, the spread of 
the crisis to other countries indicates that financial integration plays an important 
role in transmitting financial crises, since one country’s vulnerable financial 
market can have an impact on other countries through their interlinkages in 
either macroeconomic transmission or the shock transmission channel (Bordo and 
Helbling, 2003). Additionally, Minoiu et al. (2015) examine the connectedness of 
financial linkages in predicting banking crises. Connectedness plays an important 
role in the transmission of crisis, because the failure of one economic agent leads to 
direct failure (insolvency) and indirect failure (cross-border panic) as well. In line 
with Peltonen et al. (2015), we argue that the inclusion of quantitative contagion 
indexes can enhance the efficiency of existing EWMs. Although the role of financial 
contagion has been highlighted in the literature, there is still ample room to fill 
the gap associated with the weaknesses of existing EWMs. Thus, the inclusion of 
contagion indicators can fill the lacuna of existing EWMs and proves to be a crucial 
tool in enhancing the efficiency of EWMs, instead of a dummy index of contagion 
subject to post-crisis bias (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006).
Table 5 provides the five definitions and measurements highlighted by Pericoli 
and Sbracia (2003). The EWMs’ inclusion of these quantitative contagion indicators 
could enhance their efficiency.
23 An information cascade is a situation in which a person makes a decision/choice based on the 
observations or choices of others, without knowing the reality and circulates the information, 
assuming it is true.
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Table 5. 
Definition and Measurements of Contagion
The table covers the five definitions and measurements of contagion as highlighted by Pericoli and Sbracia (2003).
No. Definition Measurement
1 When a significant increase in the probability 
of a crisis in one country, conditional on a crisis 
occurring in another country. 
Exchange rate pressure index
2 When the volatility of asset prices spillover from 
the crisis country to other countries.
Multivariate GARCH model
3 When cross-country co-movements of asset prices 
cannot be explained by fundamentals.
Jumps in multiple equilibria 
4 When a significant increase in co-movements of 
prices and quantities across markets, conditional 
on a crisis occurring in one market or group 
markets.
Markov-Switching approach Correlation 
5 When the transmission channel intensifies or, 
more generally, changes after a shock in one 
market. 
Data generating process
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new agenda for augmenting existing EWMs that could 
capture the dynamic nature of financial crises. We propose an agenda based on 
three aspects: measurement of a hybrid index of the financial crisis, the need for 
a fourth-generation crisis model, and the role of contagion/interconnectedness in 
the model. This agenda could be helpful in the construction of EWMs to predict 
the occurrence of a financial event. Finally, there is an essential need to augment 
EWMs to fend off a financial crisis.
This paper’s proposed agenda for the construction of EWMs certainly does 
not constitute final steps toward a comprehensive EWM of financial crises. 
Rather, it suggests the construction of an EWM by eradicating the various lacunae 
associated with the existing models that can outline the difficulties. By suggesting 
a new agenda for the construction of EWMs to resolve these difficulties, this paper 
proposes various steps toward augmenting the existing EWMs, which could 
become more powerful tools in predicting financial crises. Future research could 
focus on the construction and empirical examination of this new agenda.
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